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JUSTIFICATION IN THE KILLING OF AN INNOCENT PERSON
JOHN MAKDISI*

John Finnis advances the notion of side effect to provide a non-consequentialist approach for justifying certain acts that result in the killing
of an innocent person.' He depends on the reader's own intelligent grasp
of the basic forms of good to convince the reader of the merit of his
argument, asking the reader as a first premise to acknowledge merely
whether he or she thinks particular values are basic human goods. 2 One
of these values is life, 3 and Finnis asks, "Life 'is a good, in itself, don't
you think?"' 4 To answer this question, Finnis invites his reader to look
at the problem from the inside out. An effort of such practical understanding is an effort to grasp and identify the human good of actions in
which we participate and from which we derive feelings, spontaneities
and behavior. 5 Therefore, if one is to capture the account of human nature
that leads one to affirm life as a first basic value, one must not only
understand but feel the conflict in the problem of justified killing raised
by Finnis. In attempting to reach this state, let me share this scenario
with you.
Imagine with me that my two children are playing quietly on the
balcony overlooking a twenty-story view of our summer resort town. The
birds are singing in a blue sun-filled sky when, suddenly, I see the whole
balcony quiver and start to fall away from the building. As my children
look up in alarm I speed towards the open sliding door. In that split second
they start to scramble back towards the door but the balcony is tearing
away from the building too fast. I grab for their hands, arms, clothingwhatever I can reach. As my hands close firmly over the wrist of one and
the shirt of the other, the balcony with a grating shriek of metal and
concrete rips from the side of the building. I feel the full weight of my
children pull me out the sliding door and as my feet catch the edges of
the door I find myself suspended in mid-air with both children dangling
at the end of my arms.
There is no way I can move to get the children safely back into the
apartment. No one else is in the apartment. I call frantically for help and
hope that the noise of the balcony falling will attract immediate aid from
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next door neighbors. After what seems like an eternity, but must be only
moments, my children start slipping from my grasp.
What to do?! With the children slipping away I have to make a decision.
Either I can continue to hold both children, in which case I feel that I
would lose them both at the same time, or I can let one child go in favor
of devoting my full efforts to the somewhat more realistic chance of saving
the other. I release the grip of my left hand. Minutes later help arrives
and pulls me and my one child into the apartment. But my other child
lies dead on the pavement below.
This event did not actually happen. Thank God! But we may dream in
dread of such an event happening. I have four children and have puzzled
painfully through my feelings in this scenario. Somehow there seems to
be no satisfactory answer as to which choice is the better one. In the
scenario I had to choose between releasing one child or possibly losing
both. I released one, but the fact that the other was saved does not assuage
the guilt that arises from participating in an act that leads to the death
of the first. I did not have the desire to do that act but I did have the
intent. I chose to act in a way that caused the loss of a child's life. Does
this guilt suggest that the choice to let one child die in favor of saving
the other is wrong and should be punished? I would have felt guilt if I
had not let the one child go and both children had fallen from my grasp.
A. Efficient Result v. Moral Means
What does a consequentialist argument offer in this case? The choice
in this draconian scenario was the almost certain chance of death for both
children against the fairer chance of saving one by losing the other. The
argument to produce the best end result would applaud the act of losing
one child in favor of saving the other. Such an argument seeks to maximize
value in society. 6 Since the attempt to save both children would have left
both their lives in serious jeopardy and the effort to save only one raised
the chances significantly of saving at least one life, the latter effort is
the better. In terms of mathematics, the darling of efficiency arguments,
if each life were considered equal to the other and the chance of saving
both children together was 1% while the chance of saving one child alone
was 10%, the expected value of the second situation would be much higher.
[.10 x value of one life] is greater than [.01 x value of two lives].
But this argument does not make sense when I think back to my balcony
scenario. Would I have felt more guilt if I had tried to save both children
and lost them both? I don't think I would. Somehow I cannot measure
the tragedy of losing one child against the tragedy of losing both. Both
of these alternatives are indefinably tragic. Perhaps, in a case such as
this, the best end result cannot be measured.

6

See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
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The consequentialist argument for efficient result requires that some
type of value or ranking be given to each alternative situation in order
to determine the greater net good. John Finnis would argue that this
7
cannot be done because the life of each child is incommensurable. One
life cannot be measured, valued, or ranked in comparison with another
life. Therefore, the "methodological injunction to maximize good is senseless" because it attempts to measure the immeasurable."
This perception of incommensurable values reflects Finnis' concept of
morally significant choice. Finnis asserts that the pursuit of certain basic
9
values in life should be undertaken as part of a coherent plan of life, but
there is no means of identifying and settling the best path in life. If there
were a rationally unopposed path in life, its choice would not be morally
significant."' "For one has a morally significant choice just where one
really does have reasons for alternative options; for then the choice can
be free, no factor but the choosing itself settling which alternative is
chosen.""
On the other hand, there is a principle of right action that requires not
"choosing (intending) to destroy, damage or impede a basic human good,
or imposing on persons, even as a side-effect, harms or burdens which
one would not impose on oneself or one's friends and which one imposes
2
for no motive other than differential feelings.' Finnis recognizes that
"one cannot act at all without accepting some bad side-effects,"' 3 but one
5
must never "choose directly against a basic value" 4 nor act unfairly.'
Therefore, if I had chosen not to let either child go, even though I most
likely would have lost both children, I would have been justified. There
would have been no choice against a basic value in that situation. On
the other hand, the act of losing one child in favor of saving the other
may or may not have been acceptable, depending on whether the release
basic
of the one child to save the other was a direct choice against the
16
value of the life of the child who was lost or my act was unfair.

supra note 1, at 119.
1Id. at 113.
1d. at 103-05.
"Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, supra note 1, at 9.
"Id. at 10.
"Id. at 11.
"NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, supra note 1, at 292.
14 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 93, 119-20, 123.
'5 Id. at 105-09.
1"Implicit in the discussion in this paper is the assumption that there is a duty
on parents to preserve the lives of their children. This duty extends from their
responsibility as parents for the safety of their children. There may be a question
whether the duty to safeguard others extends to a non-related onlooker when
observing a situation leading to the death of another and preventable by the
onlooker. The question of duty to rescue in this latter case is not raised in this
paper. We are solely concerned with the justification of one's act in a situation
where duty exists and compels the safeguard of the basic value of human life.
7 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS,

9
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B. Principleof Right Action
1. No Direct Choice against a Basic Value
What constitutes a direct choice against a basic value? Finnis asserts
that it is not justifiable to kill an innocent person in a case where a
blackmailer demands that person be killed as his price for sparing hostages. Finnis says, "the person who complies with the demand, in order
to save the lives of the many, cannot deny that he is choosing an act
which of itself does nothing but kill [thus damaging the basic value of
life]."' 17 According to Finnis one cannot morally justify the weighing of
one life against that of another or even against those of several others.
Human life is a basic good that is incommensurable.
On the other hand, Finnis asserts that some acts may damage a human
good as a side effect but are justified by the human good they directly
promote. Although he takes a strong stand against killing, including
abortion, 8 he declares:
accepting death(s) as a side-effect of one's chosen action is not
the same thing as a choice to kill.... For example, the tradition
of common morality has approved certain interventions ('therapeutic abortions' in a very narrow sense) which bring about
the death of the unborn. The approval of certain interventions
of this sort is readily explicable by our moral theory: when the
protection of either the mother's or the unborn child's life requires that something be done, and the death of the other is
only a causal consequence of doing what is necessary, the choice
to do it will be justified if it can be made without unfairness
to either party. 9
Does the release of one child to save the other in the balcony scenario
compare to the blackmail hostage case or the therapeutic abortion case?
The act of killing in either case could be intended to save another human
life. Why is it that the killing in the blackmail hostage case is not a side

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 123.
"See Finnis, Natural Law and the Rights of the Unborn, in ABORTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade THROUGH THE COURTS 115, at 119
(Horan, Grant & Cunningham eds. 1987).
"1NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, supra note 1, at 294, 311. This conclusion is part of
the more general proposition that the inherent limitations on our ability to pursue
basic goods results in the failure to realize many basic goods. See text at note 13,
supra. It is also an idea that appears in the "principle of the double effect." This
17

principle justifies the causation of evil under the following four conditions: "(1)

The action from which evil results is good or indifferent in itself; it is not morally
evil. (2) The intention of the agent is upright-that is, the evil effect is sincerely

not intended. (3) The evil effect must be equally immediate causally with the
good effect, for otherwise it would be a means to the good effect and would be
intended. (4) There must be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the evil
to occur." R. McCormick, How BRAVE A NEW WORLD? 413 (1981).
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effect of saving the hostages' lives but in the therapeutic abortion case
it is? Finnis does not focus on the consequences of the act, that is, whether
the value of losing one life is worth the saving of another. Rather, he
focuses on the nature of the act bringing about those consequences, that
is, whether the act does something more than damage a basic human
good. More specifically, he asks whether the act is a direct and immediate
promotion of a basic human good. 20
Finnis points out that the killing of the victim in the hostage case is
a means to the end of saving the hostages and not a side effect because
the basic good of saving the hostages is removed from the act of killing
the victim. The act of killing the victim is not the direct and immediate
promotion of a basic human good because the good of saving the hostages
falls within those "expected goods [that] will be realized (if at all) not as
aspects of one-and-the-same act, but as aspects or consequences of other
acts (by another person, at another time and place, as the upshot of
In the abortion case the act that inevitably
another free decision . . . ).21
kills is not an act that uses killing as a means to an end. The act that
saves the mother is not done with the desire to kill the baby, nor is the
baby's life another's precondition for the saving of the mother. Therefore,
the act that saves the mother is the direct and immediate promotion of
a basic human good, and killing the baby is a side effect. The killing of
the baby is not a means to the end of saving the mother.
The crux of the difference between these two cases is one's participation
in the evil intention of another. Although killing is not desired by the
person who kills in the hostage case, it is desired by the blackmailer; and
to the extent that the blackmailer requires the killing as a precondition
of the blackmailer's sparing the hostages, the act of the person who kills
under the blackmailer's direction to satisfy his requirement participates
in the evil intention of the blackmailer. Participation involves the choice
to satisfy the blackmailer's desired purpose in order to induce the blackmailer to act or not act.
If the blackmailer in the hostage case had roughed up a pregnant
mother in order to produce the situation that we have noted in the abortion case, would the abortion of the baby not be justified? It is the desired
purpose of the blackmailer to induce the taking of the baby's life in order
to save the mother, but the saving of the mother still does not depend on
the will of the blackmailer. Killing the baby would be part of the process
of stopping non-human-willed forces moving towards the death of the
mother, even though those forces were set in motion by a human will.
Therefore, again, the act that saves the mother is the direct and immediate promotion of a basic human good, and killing the baby is a side
effect.

20 NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS,

21Id.

supra note 1, at 120-23.

at 122.
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The point that Finnis makes in his discussion ofjustified choice is that
intention counts but not in the way we ordinarily define intention. Intention is ordinarily defined in tort cases to mean:
(1) ...a state of mind (2) about consequences of an act (or
omission) and not about the act itself, and (3) it extends not
only to having in the mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about
given consequences but also to having in mind a belief (or
knowledge) that given consequences are substantially certain
22
to result from the act.
Therefore, if one aborts the baby to save the mother, the knowledge that
the baby will die makes the killing of the baby intentional under the tort
law definition of intent. According to Finnis, the definition of intention
does not include "having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences are substantially certain to result from the act." "Having in
mind a purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences" is the focus
of concern to Finnis. One does nothing but damage a basic human good
if one desires the killing of a life either as an end or as a means to an
end, and one desires the killing of a life as a means to an end when one
participates in the desire of another to kill life as an end. The killing of
life is neither a means nor an end if it is done in the course of an act to
promote a basic human good and the act does not depend on the killing
of life as such to promote the basic human good.
Finnis is adamant that one need not and should not hold himself out
as "a tool for all those willing to threaten sufficiently bad consequences
if he does not cooperate with them. ' 23 The intervention of another human

will may turn the choice that results in killing from a justified to an
unjustified act. This does not mean, however, that the act in direct and
immediate promotion of a basic human good need be void of human intervention. In the abortion case the killing of the baby is part of an act
that results in the saving of the mother. It is justified even though the
doctor still needs to exercise his will to complete the procedures that will
save the mother after the baby has died. Likewise, in the balcony scenario,
the act of dropping one child to hold the other is the direct and immediate
promotion of saving the life of the other child which depends on someone
else coming into the apartment and pulling the child to safety.
2. Fairness
The argument thus far is that the killing of a person in order to convince
another person not to kill is unjustifiable. The killing of a person as part
of an effort not to stop a human will but rather to stop the movement of

22
23

PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAw OF

TORTS 34 (5th ed. 1984).
supra note 1, at 121.

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS,
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forces towards death may be justifiable. Yet, even though an act may be
taken in the direct and immediate promotion of a human good, such as,
the saving of human life, the resulting side effect of death to another may
still be unjustifiable.
Professor Rollin Perkins poses the following case:
Consider, hypothetically, a man and a child, total strangers,
driven through the countryside in a small horse-drawn vehicle.
Suddenly, at a remote spot, they are attacked by ferocious
beasts. The driver attempts to elude them, but the horse cannot
outdistance the beasts. At the last moment, the man throws
the child to the beasts. They stop to devour the child, thus
enabling the man and his driver to reach safety. The man
insists that had it not been for his foresight in tossing the child
to the beasts, he, the child, and the driver would have been
destroyed; although the act was unfortunate, it was the best
act under the circumstances.... [Yet] the man had a different
by heroically
choice: he could have ensured the safety of two
24
jumping out and facing the animals himself.
This case raises the issue of fairness. The man in the wild beast case
preferred himself over the child merely to save himself. He could have
thrown himself out of the vehicle to save the other two. The act of throwing
out the child was not justified because it was selfish and therefore unfair.
Finnis remarked in the therapeutic abortion case involving mother and
child that the choice that results in death is justified only "if it can be
made without unfairness to either party."25 Acting without unfairness
involves the absence of selfishness. "The core of the moral norm of fairness
27
26
is the Golden Rule. The act of saving must not be partial or arbitrary.
Thus, if there is no chance to save the child without saving the mother
because the child is not yet viable outside the womb, and the mother
cannot be saved without killing the child, there is no issue of unfairness
and killing the child may be considered a justifiable side effect of an act
in the direct and immediate promotion of saving the mother's life.
Perkins offers another example of fairness:
Two men, B and C, are climbing a mountain, roped together
for mutual protection. As they inch along a narrow ledge, B
suddenly slips off, dragging C over with him. C manages to get
a firm grip as he goes over the ledge, but hangs there, with B
dangling unconscious at the end of the rope some feet below.
C can hold on temporarily with one hand but cannot pull up
B with the other. C holds on grimly until he senses that mo-

24

Perkins, Impelled Perpetration Restated, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 406 (1981)

[hereinafter Perkins].

25NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, supra note 1, at 311. See also text accompanying
supra note 19.
2 Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, supra note 1, at 11.
27

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note
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mentarily his grip will slip and both will plunge to their deaths.
At that instant, C cuts the rope, letting B drop to his death.
Without the extra weight of B, C is then able to pull himself
up to safety. In this case, C did not choose between himself and
B: B was doomed. C could not do anything to save B. C's choice
was either to save his own life, or to submit to his own and B's
deaths.

28

In this case the act is justified. A person is killed as a result of an effort
to stop forces moving towards death and the act of killing is done without
partiality, arbitrariness or unfairness, because there is no choice. Only
one person, if any, can be saved.
But what if the baby could be saved in the therapeutic abortion case?
What if the choice were truly between the mother and the child? Likewise,
in the balcony scenario there is a choice between the two children. Which
child may one choose to drop? Can that choice be made without partiality
or unfairness? Finnis does not appear to have raised this issue, and I am
not sure there is a clear answer to this question.
Finnis mentions one case that resembles that of the choice between
two innocent lives, and that is the case of a choice between one's own life
and that of another:
Those who heroically choose to save another in some desperate
situation sometimes foresee their own death as an inevitable
consequence. But they do not choose to destroy their own lives.
Of itself, their death does nothing to save anyone's life, and so
is not included in the precise object of their choices. What they
do before they die, not their very death, is what they choose.
The precise object of their choices is to do what saves. They
[foresee and] accept their own death, only as an unavoidable
[unintended] side-effect of doing what is necessary to save the
29
other's life.

Implicit in the approval of such an act is Finnis' judgment that it is
fair. In fact it does satisfy the Golden Rule because one has done unto
oneself in lieu of doing unto others. Thus, if the blackmailer were to shoot
his gun at the hostages one might justifiably throw oneself in front of his
gun in order to prevent their deaths even though one foresees one's own
death by that act. In such a case the act is designed to stop forces moving
towards death without unfairness because one has accepted the burden
on oneself.
But what about the case where one can only throw another person in
the path of death to save a life? Suppose the blackmailer were to shoot
his gun at the hostages and a father, confined to his wheelchair and
holding his only son, were to throw his son in front of the blackmailer's

2

Perkins, supra note 24, at 406.
supra note 1, at 311.

29 NUCLEAR DETERRENCE,
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gun in order to prevent the deaths of the hostages. It is not clear that
Finnis would condone such an act. Again, the answer to this question is
not clear.
It should be noted, of course, that one aspect of fairness in the justifiable
killing of an innocent person is that it be a choice of last resort. If there
is another alternative, such as waiting for a neighbor in the balcony
scenario, that alternative must be exercised. It is only when the side
effect of death is the only possible consequence of saving the life of another
that that choice can be fair and justifiable.
C. Evidence of Finnis' Theory in Two Common Law Cases
Finnis' argument to distinguish justifiable from unjustifiable acts that
include the consequence of death emphasizes the inability of reason to
settle on what is the better choice in the balcony scenario. There is no
one right answer because the values involved are incommensurable.
There are standards by which one can judge what is not justifiable. If the
act of killing is not a side effect or is a choice made unfairly, the killing
is wrong. The blackmail hostage case and the wild beast case are examples. However, if an act is performed in the direct and immediate
promotion of preserving life, Finnis refuses to judge the act by its consequences in terms of how many lives are saved so long as the act is done
fairly to all concerned. The therapeutic abortion, heroic self-sacrifice and
mountain climber cases are examples. In the balcony scenario, it is justifiable to hold on to both children even though it means almost certain
death to both. It may also be justifiable to release one child to hold the
other, although the question of which child to release raises an issue of
fairness that is not fully resolved. With this theory in mind, let us turn
to two noted cases in the common law that involved killing in the act of
saving others. Both cases are particularly reflective of the approach
adopted by Finnis.
In 1842 the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
U.S. v. Holmes30 found that a sailor's duty to protect passengers even in
cases of extreme peril was violated when passengers were thrown overboard. A leaky longboat held several people who had escaped a shipwreck.
It was in grave danger of sinking when the crew threw fourteen male
passengers overboard. No lots were cast nor were the passengers informed
or consulted. Despite the fact that the defendant sailor had been heroic
initially in his efforts to save the passengers from the ship when it was
sinking, he was charged and convicted of unlawful homicide for his subsequent act of throwing passengers overboard to save the longboat from
sinking. His defense that the homicide was necessary for self-preservation
was rejected.

30

26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1990

9

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:85

Holmes did not reject the defense of necessity. It merely stated that the
doctrine of necessity did not apply in this particular case. The prosecutor
suggested and the court agreed that there was an argument for justifiable
homicide if, among people in equal relations, 1 there had been notice,
consultation and a casting of lots in a sacrifice that was absolutely indispensable to save the remaining lives.3 2 This justification for an act
that results in killing is precisely the point that Finnis seeks to elaborate.
It is justifiable to preserve life even though a side effect may be the death
of another. In Holmes the court indicated that throwing people overboard
would be permissible if absolutely necessary to preserve life so long as
the selection of the victim was made fairly, as by lot. The death of the
people thrown overboard was not a means to the end of saving the others.
Throwing the people overboard was a means of saving the longboat from
sinking by lightening the load; death was only a side effect.
The only reason that a verdict of guilty was rendered in Holmes was
that the means used were unfair in the choice of victims and perhaps
without sufficient regard to minimizing the damaging side effects (too
many people thrown overboard). This reason of unfairness is the second
prong of Finnis' principle of right action. Without fairness the act is
unjustified even though killing is a side effect.
In a similar case in 1884 the Queen's Bench Division in Regina v. Dudley
& Stevens33 found that two men cast adrift on the sea were not justified
in killing a boy and eating him to save their lives. The defendants had
consumed all food by the twelfth day and did not perform the killing until
the twentieth day. It was found that if the men had not fed on the boy
they would probably not have survived, and the boy would probably have
been the first to die. The court decided that the necessity to preserve one's
life was not a justifiable excuse for taking the life of an innocent person.
The boy who was killed was never consulted nor were lots drawn, but
the court did not find merely that fairness did not exist in this case; it
34
found that necessity itself was not a defense for the killing.
Dudley & Stevens adopts an absolutist approach. Under no circumstances is the taking of life allowed in such a case. Finnis would probably
agree. Cannibalism involves the distinct act of killing a person as a means
31There was an argument that a sailor was not in equal relations with a
passenger and had a duty to sacrifice himself before the passenger as long as he
was not necessary for the running of the boat. Id. at 367.
32 It is interesting that in dictum the court in Holmes found no difference
between cannibalism and throwing overboard. The court stated:

When the ship is in no danger of sinking, but all sustenance is
exhausted, and a sacrifice of one person is necessary to appease the
hunger of others, the selection is by lot. This mode is resorted to as
the fairest mode, and, in some sort, as an appeal to God, for selection

of the victim.
U.S. v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 367. As we shall note, this dictum contradicts the

decision in Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), and contradicts
Finnis' theory, but it does not change the consistency of the holding in Holmes
with Finnis' theory.
33 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).

Id. at 287-88.
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of being able to eat that person. If the person is not dead, the cannibal
cannot eat. If it were possible for the cannibal to start eating a live person
who dies in the process, death may be viewed as a side effect. In Dudley
& Stevens, however, death was an intended means to the end of saving
lives from starvation. Therefore, it was not a side effect, and Finnis would
condemn such an act as adamantly as the court.
While Holmes and Dudley & Stevens accord with Finnis' concept of
justified killing, it should be noted that necessity is raised in the two
cases as a defense to a wrongful act. In Holmes this defense was approved
(and would have succeeded except for the issue of unfairness). The act of
throwing people overboard, if done fairly, was considered wrong but necessity would have justified it. Finnis, on the other hand, would argue
that the act of throwing people overboard, if done fairly, was not wrong
and needed no defense. When killing is not an end nor a means to an
end, Finnis asserts that the actor does not "intend" the killing; the actor
intends the saving, and the killing is an unintended effect - thus, a side
effect. Finnis would agree that the killing in Holmes could have been
foreseen as an inevitable effect of the act of lightening the boat, but this
foreseeability need not have affected intention. The common law concept
of intent differs from that of Finnis. It includes the state of mind in which
the effect of an act is foreseen. Thus, in Holmes the act of throwing
overboard was considered an intentional act of killing those thrown overboard because their deaths were foreseen by the actor. Once defined as
wrongful, the act needed a defense in order to be justified. Nevertheless,
the philosophy in Holmes still accords with that of Finnis despite the
technical difference in approach.
D. The Reality of Finnis'Approach
It is appropriate to call Finnis' approach to life as an incommensurable
basic human good a natural law approach. It suggests that there is more
to life than just an accumulation of wealth, happiness, value, etc. There
is something about life that we cannot value, that we cannot measure,
that we cannot fathom, that is mysterious. While contract and even some
tort law are readily adaptable to arguments of economic efficiency (and
I am a very strong proponent of Law and Economics in this regard), there
are areas where such arguments do not belong. Specifically, where the
end result cannot be measured because the values at stake are incommensurable, there may be no best answer in a conflictive situation with
differing alternatives. There can only be a best means to possibly several
different end results.
In the case of the balcony scenario, the act of releasing one child is as
permissible as holding on to both children with the almost inevitable
effect of losing both, as long as the means follow the principle of right
action. The death of one or both children must be a side effect of the act
seeking to save life, and, if a choice is made that results in the death of
one, it must be made fairly. This approach makes sense when viewed
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from within the experience of the act itself. It is also the view adopted
in Holmes and Dudley & Stevens in two of the very rare instances such
cases have come before the courts. These cases affirm that lives should
not be ascribed values that can be added or subtracted for a best end
result. It is the means and not the end that determines the justification
for human action.
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